

A DECADE FROM PARIS

Country Notes Collection from Climate Transparency Partners



WELCOME MESSAGE



A decade after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the global climate conversation has entered a new phase. What began in 2015 as a shared framework for ambition has evolved into a far more complex challenge: delivering implementation under conditions of geopolitical fragmentation, economic uncertainty, and rising social and environmental pressures. While our first edition reflected on the experiences of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and Mexico, this new volume turns to four systemic actors – Argentina, China, Russia, and Türkiye – whose diverse realities illustrate the increasingly differentiated pathways shaping the transition. Despite shifting political and economic dynamics, my conviction remains unchanged:

the Paris Agreement continues to provide the most important common framework for collective climate action. Yet today, the central question is no longer whether the transition is possible, but whether it can advance with the speed, credibility, and fairness required across vastly different national contexts.

At a time when global attention is often focused on widening climate gaps – emissions, finance, adaptation, and trust – it is equally important to recognize that progress, while uneven, continues to accelerate in critical sectors. Renewable energy deployment has expanded at unprecedented rates, clean technologies are increasingly driving industrial competitiveness, and energy transitions are becoming closely tied to economic resilience, public health, and long-term security. Climate action is no longer motivated by environmental necessity alone; it is increasingly shaped by the strategic realities of industrial modernization, energy independence, and social stability.

The inclusion of these four nations is intentional. In China, we see the unprecedented scale of renewable energy deployment and industrial transformation redefining the global energy landscape. In Russia, we examine the tensions between economic diversification, carbon management, and the enduring role of fossil fuels within an evolving geopolitical order. In Türkiye, we recognize a strategic regional actor navigating growing energy demand, industrial expansion, and climate governance ambitions across multiple regions. And in Argentina, we see the challenge of balancing macroeconomic pressures with long-term low-emission development in sectors such as agriculture and energy. Together, these cases demonstrate that there is no single pathway to implementation; transitions are shaped by different political realities, economic structures, institutional capacities, and social priorities.

WELCOME MESSAGE

This report arrives at a critical moment between the first Global Stocktake and the next cycle of collective assessment under the Paris Agreement. The first GST provided more than a snapshot of global progress; it established a recurring process of accountability, course correction, and implementation signals that will shape climate governance in the years ahead. As countries begin to operationalize updated NDCs and translate long-term strategies into measurable outcomes, transparency becomes increasingly important not only as a reporting exercise, but as the foundation for credibility, informed decision-making, and public trust. Our analysis therefore moves beyond identifying gaps to understanding how transitions can accelerate while safeguarding social resilience, economic stability, and public health. I have dedicated my career to policy advocacy because technical data only comes to life through political will, and because the success of climate action ultimately depends on whether societies experience the transition as a pathway toward greater prosperity, inclusion, and resilience.

On the road to COP31, this report is our contribution to a more informed and constructive international dialogue. Supported by the deep technical expertise of our national partners, the Climate Transparency Initiative will continue to provide rigorous, independent analysis to support implementation, accountability, and evidence-based policymaking in an increasingly complex global environment.

This second edition is an invitation to continue advancing the work that began in Paris a decade ago, recognizing that while the direction of travel is increasingly clear, the pace, fairness, and credibility of implementation remain contested. The years ahead will not be defined by ambition alone, but by our collective capacity to translate commitments into durable economic and social transformation, leaving no one behind in the transition toward a more resilient and inclusive future.

Jorge Villarreal Padilla

Climate Transparency Director

Climate Policy Director, Iniciativa Climática de México (ICM)

INTRODUCTION

Ten years have passed since the adoption of the Paris Agreement – the most consequential accord in human history, uniting nearly every nation around a shared purpose: to confront the existential threat of climate change and to chart a collective path toward a safer, sustainable future.

Humans have existed for at least 200,000 years. Human civilization based on agriculture around 9,000. The modern nation-state system, for a few centuries. The industrial revolution – which set humanity on its current carbon-intensive path – is just over 250 years old. The United Nations has been with us for nearly 80. And yet, the Paris Agreement, only ten years young, already stands as a historic milestone in our collective evolution – a blueprint for planetary cooperation in the face of our greatest shared challenge.

Economic, political, and geopolitical realities have shifted. Technology has accelerated. The global energy map has been redrawn. Yet through all this transformation, one constant endures: countries remain committed to the Paris Agreement and to the vision it represents.

The journey has not been without setbacks. The United States, one of the architects of the Agreement, has departed from it twice within this decade, and in several corners of the world, climate ambition has faltered and doubt expanded. Still, the global community moves forward – adapting, innovating, and working to reduce emissions, enable a just energy transition, and strengthen resilience to climate impacts that are already shaping lives and economies.

Through this now second release of the Collection, we gather country notes from four new countries: Argentina, China, Russia and Türkiye, to take the tenth anniversary as a moment for reflection. It revisits what nations said in 2015 – their promises, aspirations, and targets – and compares them with what they are saying today. It opens the floor to reflect how far countries have come in mobilizing finance, developing low-carbon technologies, and ensuring that the transition is just and inclusive. Our ambition to cover the world's top 20 economies remains.

This builds on Climate Transparency's focus on the G20 countries, not as a convening group “the G20”, but rather as a collective responsible for close to 75% of global emissions and the vast majority of global energy use and economic output. According to IRENA, G20 countries on average increased their renewable power generation by 69% from 2014 to 2023, from 212,300 GWh to 359,245 GWh. This example reminds us what is possible.

Above all, this exercise invites the beginning of common reflection not only on how far we have traveled, but on where we must go next. Multilateral international climate governance is still in its very early infancy and under unparalleled pressure to deliver. Despite the challenges to global multilateral governance, the spirit of the Paris Agreement and the United Nations' climate framework endures – reminding us that, even in a fragmented world, collective action remains our greatest strength and hope.



ARGENTINA: A DECADE OF CLIMATE CONTRADICTIONS

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


2015 | Argentina ratified the Paris Agreement and elevated its climate governance by creating the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development.

2025 | Climate governance was downgraded to an Undersecretariat and the country failed to submit its updated NDC 3.0 on time.

GENERAL PROGRESS: PARIS GOALS

FINANCE MOBILIZATION



Argentina's Biennial Transparency Report reveals that "mitigation and adaptation" finance has supported natural gas expansion and large-scale hydropower infrastructure. Gas infrastructure risks fossil fuel lock-in, stranded assets, and the infringement of Indigenous rights. Ensuring climate finance supports a just, rights-based transition remains a critical challenge.

LOW-CARBON TECH



Argentina's second National Adaptation and Mitigation Plan (PNAyMCC) signals a multi-sectoral framework for low-carbon technologies; however, many measures risk reinforcing fossil-fuel-dependent development. Natural gas remains a "transition fuel," while hydrogen and hydropower are promoted without a clear fossil fuel phase-out. Consequently, low-carbon deployment may coexist with fossil fuel expansion, increasing territorial vulnerabilities and compromising long-term decarbonization integrity.

JUST TRANSITION



Argentina's second NDC and PNAyMCC establish just transition, socio-environmental justice, and equity as guiding principles, including a transversal line on just labour transition. However, despite this formal recognition, the approach has not been systematically operationalised across sectoral climate, energy, or productive policies. Due to the lack of concrete mechanisms to protect workers, ensure community participation, and redistribute transition costs, just transition currently functions more as a normative commitment than as a binding framework shaping Argentina's decarbonisation pathway.

WHAT THEY SAID THEN: 2015

"Aware of the importance and the need to ensure that the entry into force of the Paris Agreement is not delayed, Argentina commits to making its greatest efforts for its prompt ratification."

Representación Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas



Susana Malcorra
(Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship)

Signature Ceremony of the Paris Agreement
April 2016

WHAT THEY SAY NOW: 2025

"Wokism, furthermore, manifests itself in sinister radical environmentalism and the banner of climate change. Preserving our planet for future generations is a matter of common sense; nobody wants to live in a dump. But once again, wokism managed to pervert that elementary idea of preserving the environment for the enjoyment of human beings. We have moved toward a fanatical environmentalism where humans are seen as a cancer that must be eliminated, and economic development as little less than a crime against nature."

Casa Rosada Presidencia

Javier Milei
(President of Argentina from 2023 to the present)

Davos Forum
January 2025



GENERAL OVERVIEW BY




Ten years after Paris, Argentina's climate trajectory shows setbacks from its 2015 leadership. The downgrading of the Ministry of Environment, budget cuts, and the absence of an updated NDC reflect a growing gap between technical needs and official policy, while rising emissions and extreme weather increasingly impact territories and ecosystems.

Advancing Argentina's agenda requires rebuilding institutional capacity and updating climate commitments through a socio-environmental justice lens. Strengthening mitigation and accelerating adaptation are essential steps to restore credibility and reopen a constructive dialogue that protects both people and the environment.



BRAZIL: FROM TURBULENCE TO NET ZERO

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2015 | wind and solar together accounted for approximately **5%** of Brazil's electricity generation.

2025 | wind and solar are expected to supply around **25%** of Brazil's power generation.




2015 | deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon totaled **6 207 km²**.

2024 | forest loss fell to **6 518 km²** in 2024—a reduction of over 50 % vs 2021. This is the lowest figure since 2017. If these measures continue, annual loss may drop to around **5 800 km²** by 2025, moving Brazil closer to its zero-deforestation by 2030 goal.

GENERAL PROGRESS: PARIS GOALS

FINANCE MOBILIZATION



Brazil has strengthened its climate-finance ecosystem through the Plano Clima, Fundo Clima, and BNDES Green Banking Strategy. Instruments such as the National Sustainable Taxonomy, green bonds, and FIP Transição Energética e Descarbonização are scaling private participation. Yet, aligning fiscal incentives and expanding concessional funding remain crucial to closing investment gaps for a just transition.

LOW-CARBON TECH



Brazil has advanced renewables, bioenergy, and emerging low-carbon industries. The Fuels of the Future Law expanded biofuel mandates, and the Hydrogen Law established a framework for low-carbon hydrogen. With 87% renewable electricity, Brazil now pursues green steel, sustainable aviation fuels, and CCUS under the Nova Indústria Brasil and Plano Clima, though industrial decarbonization remains difficult.

JUST TRANSITION



Brazil is embedding just transition principles in federal and state policies. The Plano Clima includes a transversal Just Transition component, complemented by the Nova Indústria Brasil and Plano de Transição Ecológica. The Centro Brasil no Clima develops the Just Transition Plan for Plano Clima Mitigação. Still, operational mechanisms and financing pathways for coal and oil regions remain limited.

WHAT THEY SAID THEN: 2015

"The principle of common but differentiated responsibility is the cornerstone of the agreement. [...] All developing countries must be enabled to walk the path of a low-carbon economy while overcoming extreme poverty and reducing inequalities."

UNFCCC, 2015



Dilma Rousseff
(President of Brazil from 2011 to 2016)

COP21
November 2015

WHAT THEY SAY NOW: 2025

"The denialism we face is not only due to climate, it is due to multilateralism. [...] Nature does not bow to bombs or warships. [...] By hosting COP in the Amazon, Brazil wants to show that it is impossible to preserve nature without caring for people."

DGC, 2025

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (President of Brazil from 2003 to 2011, and from 2023 to the present)

Climate Summit
September 2025



GENERAL OVERVIEW BY




CENTRO
BRASIL
NO CLIMA

Brazil's climate narrative has grown increasingly ambitious, centered on net-zero by 2050, reindustrialization, and social inclusion. Yet, technical implementation still lags behind rhetoric, and sustaining the recent deforestation reductions toward a zero-deforestation goal remains one of the country's most pressing challenges.

Brazil's next steps must focus on turning ambitious policies into verifiable results. The implementation of the regulated carbon market and the Plano Clima's MRV framework can anchor a consistent decarbonization pathway. Consolidating the recent deforestation decline into a zero-deforestation trajectory, expanding green industrial investment through the BNDES, and delivering the Just Transition Plan are decisive for achieving a fair and credible transition.

CHINA: GREEN AND LOW-CARBON TRANSFORMATION

A decade from Paris: Country Notes Collection from Climate Transparency partners



2015 | Share of renewable energy generation in total electricity generation was **19.6%**

2025 | Share of renewable energy generation in total electricity generation was **38.5%**




2015 | Energy consumption per 10,000 yuan of GDP decreased by **5.6%**

2024 | Energy consumption per unit of GDP decreased by **11.6%** compared with the end of 2020, making China one of the countries with the fastest decline in energy intensity globally.

GENERAL PROGRESS: PARIS GOALS

FINANCE MOBILIZATION



China explicitly proposed for the first time to "establish a green financial system". After nearly a decade of rapid development, the issuance scale of green bonds has grown by an average of 16.5% annually, ranking among the world's leading positions. By the end of 2023, a total of 3,086 projects had been included in the climate investment and financing pilot program initiated in 2021, with a total credit line amounting to 455,384 billion yuan.

LOW-CARBON TECH



China's installed capacity of non-fossil energy had reached 2.22 billion kilowatts, accounting for as high as 60.9% of the country's total installed capacity. Emerging technologies such as using hydrogen instead of traditional coke as a reducing agent can reduce carbon emissions per ton of steel by more than 80%. However, in the future, it is still necessary to break through bottlenecks such as high costs and obstacles to large-scale commercial application.

JUST TRANSITION



President Xi Jinping emphasized that advancing a just transition should be people-centered, coordinating improvements in people's well-being with climate governance, and balancing multiple objectives including environmental protection, economic development, job creation, and poverty eradication. China has used special funds for supply-side structural reform to support the reallocation of workers in the coal and steel sectors, proposed establishing a differentiated transition assessment framework, and released *China Energy Transition Outlook 2025*.

WHAT THEY SAID THEN: 2015

"China is vigorously promoting ecological civilization construction, promoting green, circular and low-carbon development, integrating climate change response into the country's medium-and long-term economic and social development plans, and adhering to both mitigation and adaptation to climate change."

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2015



Xi Jinping
(President of China from 2013 until now)

COP21
November 2015

WHAT THEY SAY NOW: 2025

"We have put forward a new round of NDCs, which are goals formulated by China in line with the requirements of the Paris Agreement and reflecting our maximum efforts. We are willing to work with all parties to promote the Global Governance Initiative, build a global climate governance system that is fair, reasonable and emphasizes win-win cooperation, and jointly create a clean, beautiful and sustainable world."

Xinhua News Agency, 2025

Xi Jinping
(President of China from 2013 until now)

COP 30
September 2025




GENERAL OVERVIEW BY



China is a firm actor and major contributor to global green development. Since announcing its carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals in 2020, China has built the world's largest and fastest-growing renewable energy system, established the world's largest and most complete new energy industrial chain, and contributed one quarter of the world's newly increased green area. Regardless of how the international situation evolves, China's actions to address climate change will not slow down, its efforts to promote international cooperation will not weaken, and its practice of building a community with a shared future for mankind will not cease.

GERMANY: LEADING A TOUGH TRANSITION

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
2015 † Share of Renewables in gross electricity consumption was **31.6%**.

2024 † Share of Renewables in gross electricity consumption was **54.4%**.

Source: Umweltbundesamt, 2025.

GENERAL PROGRESS: PARIS GOALS

FINANCE MOBILIZATION



Germany pledged €6 billion annually for climate finance by 2025, exceeding this in 2022 and 2024. However, declining budget allocations threaten future commitments, with a €1 billion shortfall expected in 2025. Germany contributes to the Loss & Damage Fund and Adaptation Fund, and mobilizes private investment, but adaptation finance still lags behind mitigation, risking imbalance and unmet needs.

LOW-CARBON TECH



Renewables now dominate Germany's power mix, with wind at 33% and solar at 14% in 2024, enabling coal phaseout. Battery storage grows, though grid limits persist. Newly installed heat pumps surpassed gas boilers in 2025, while industry decarbonization lags. Green tech employs 3.4 million workers, surpassing autos, but transport emissions remain high as EVs represent only 3.3% of the fleet.

JUST TRANSITION



Germany plans a full coal phaseout by 2038, likely earlier, requiring equitable transitions for regions like Lusatia and the Rhineland. Policies emphasize reskilling, diversification, and mobility support. The EU's Just Transition Fund supplements these measures, yet stronger focus is needed to ensure affected workers and communities share the benefits of decarbonization while maintaining regional economic resilience.

WHAT THEY SAID THEN: 2015

"Industrialised countries have to play a leading role as regards the development of decarbonisation technologies. It was us who caused the emissions of the past. Now we have to develop the technology needed to reduce emissions in the future."

The Federal Chancellor, 2015



Angela Merkel

(Chancellor of Germany from 2005 to 2021)

**COP21
November 2015**

WHAT THEY SAY NOW: 2025

"Even though total NDCs still do not meet the Paris Agreement's ambition, [...] the global energy transition is well underway. Technological and economic conditions for further progress have never been better, and many countries are working successfully on solutions."

BMUKN, 2025

Jochen Flasbarth (State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Climate Action, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety of Germany)

**Climate Week NYC
September 2025**




GENERAL OVERVIEW BY

Germany targets a 65% emissions reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2045. Renewable expansion has improved projections, yet slow heat pump adoption, lagging vehicle electrification, and fossil fuel dependence pose obstacles. Corrective policies are needed to ensure intermediate and long-term targets are met, prioritizing rapid emission cuts, subsidy reform, and structural transformation.

Achieving climate targets requires accelerating sectoral transformation, especially in transport, buildings, and industry. Energy efficiency, low-carbon technologies, hydrogen, circular economy approaches, and industrial electrification are essential. Aligning climate and social policies ensures an equitable transition, preventing disadvantaged parts of the population from being left behind while enabling Germany to meet its national and international commitments.

JAPAN: INNOVATION AND TECH LEAD

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2015 † Percentage of electricity generated from clean renewable energy: **9.6%**

2023 † Percentage of electricity generated from clean renewable energy: **17.3%**

GENERAL PROGRESS: PARIS GOALS

FINANCE MOBILIZATION



Japan's 2023 Basic Policy for Green Transformation targets JPY 150 trillion (USD 1 trillion) in public and private investment over the next decade. The government issued JPY 20 trillion in transition bonds to fund subsidies. Internationally, Japan pledged to mobilize JPY 6.5 trillion in climate finance from 2021 to 2025, reinforcing its G7 commitment to global decarbonization.

LOW-CARBON TECH



Renewable energy has grown rapidly since 2011, yet current expansion remains insufficient to meet 2030 and 2035 solar and wind targets. Japan must strengthen economic incentives for renewables while enhancing social acceptance through local stakeholder engagement. Accelerated innovation, grid reform, and clearer market mechanisms are crucial for achieving national deployment goals and advancing a low-carbon energy mix.

JUST TRANSITION



Japan's Global Warming Countermeasures Plan highlights the importance of a just transition in industrial decarbonization but lacks concrete policy integration. The Strategic Energy Plan, guiding long-term energy priorities, omits the concept entirely. Implementing just transition measures will require clearer strategies for workforce reskilling, regional revitalization, and stakeholder inclusion to ensure equity in Japan's green transformation.

WHAT THEY SAID THEN: 2015

"The key to acting against climate change without sacrificing economic growth is the development of innovative technologies. [...] Japan will [...] promote diffusion of advanced low carbon technologies particularly through implementation of the Joint Crediting Mechanism."

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015



Shinzo Abe
(Prime Minister of Japan from 2012 to 2020)

COP21
November 2015

WHAT THEY SAY NOW: 2025

"Japan's new Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) [...] includes blue carbon sequestration. Japan will establish methods for calculating GHG sequestration by blue carbon ecosystems and take the lead in developing international standards."

UN SDGS, 2025

Matsumoto Hisashi
(Member of the House of Representatives)

UN SDG 14 Conference
2025




GENERAL OVERVIEW BY **IGES** Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

Japan has continuously reduced emissions since 2013. Energy intensity has improved at a nearly constant rate for over 20 years since 1999, contributing significantly to emission reductions. While emission intensity has also improved since 2013, achieving NDC 2.0, NDC 3.0, and the 2050 net-zero target requires further improvement—specifically, accelerating the transition from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels.

MEXICO: RISING TO THE CHALLENGE

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2015 | Percentage of electricity generated in the 1st semester from clean renewable energy: **15,86%**

2025 | Percentage of electricity generated in the 1st semester from clean renewable energy: **26,5%**




2015 | Energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and GDP: 280 Kilo Joules per weight of GDP produced

2025 | Energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and GDP: 254,6 Kilo Joules per weight of GDP produced

GENERAL PROGRESS: PARIS GOALS

FINANCE MOBILIZATION



Mexico, Latin America's second-largest climate finance recipient, leads in green sovereign bonds. Through its Sustainable Finance Mobilization Strategy and Green Taxonomy, it promotes private sector participation. However, broader investment remains constrained by weak policy alignment and limited public-private coordination. Strengthening fiscal incentives and institutional capacity is essential to scale financing for an equitable and effective climate transition.

LOW-CARBON TECH



Renewable energy's share in Mexico's mix has grown, but expansion has slowed sharply over the past seven years amid policy shifts favoring fossil fuels and declining private investment. Political uncertainty hampers progress in transport, industry, and efficiency. Restoring investor confidence and regulatory consistency will be key to resuming low-carbon technology deployment and advancing national decarbonization goals.

JUST TRANSITION



Mexico has embedded energy justice, gender equality, and community well-being into its legal and policy frameworks. However, the absence of a fossil fuel phaseout plan and limited regulatory capacity hinder implementation. Strengthening institutional coordination, defining measurable targets, and ensuring equitable energy access are critical next steps to operationalize just transition principles across Mexico's climate and energy agenda.

WHAT THEY SAID THEN: 2015

"Mexico was the first developing country to present its NDC to the UN, convinced that it is possible to establish a new climate regime without hindering economic and social development. It is indeed possible to grow economically and generate social well-being while protecting the environment."

Gobierno de México, 2015



Enrique Peña Nieto
(President of Mexico from 2012 to 2018)

COP21
November 2015

WHAT THEY SAY NOW: 2025

"We do not have a Plan B, nor do we have a Planet B. Every second counts in this historic fight for climate justice. We need a paradigm shift that goes beyond the model on the overexploitation of our natural resources."

Gobierno de México, 2025

Alicia Bárcena (Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources of Mexico)

Climate Week NYC 2025
September 2025




GENERAL OVERVIEW BY



As one of the first Latin American countries to ever submit an NDC, Mexico developed sectoral instruments over the past decade that enabled renewable energy deployment and supported national energy goals. Yet these efforts faced setbacks, partly due to the absence of a just transition lens. By placing stronger emphasis on poverty reduction, social equity, and climate justice criteria in its energy and development policies, Mexico could reaffirm its role as a climate leader through an ambitious NDC 3.0.

RUSSIA: FOCUS ON ADAPTATION AND NATURE-BASED SOLUTIONS

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2015 | Green and transition energy sources (nuclear, hydro, gas, renewables) share of total electricity supply: **83.8%**

2025 | Green and transition energy sources (nuclear, hydro, gas, renewables) share of total electricity supply: **81.1%**

2015 | Carbon intensity of GDP (kg CO₂e per 2021 PPP \$ of GDP) **0.34**

2025 | Carbon intensity of GDP (kg CO₂e per 2021 PPP \$ of GDP) **0.33**

GENERAL PROGRESS: PARIS GOALS

FINANCE MOBILIZATION



Since 2021, Russia has developed a national sustainable finance architecture, including a taxonomy for green, transition, and social projects. By 2026, the total value of sustainable bond issues reached 615 billion rubles. Voluntary carbon market was launched, with the national registry accounting for 101 climate projects and 36.5 million carbon units issued. However, Western sanctions continue to limit access to global financial markets, impeding the placement of Russian climate securities abroad.

LOW-CARBON TECH



Russia's green strategy focuses on nature-based solutions and nuclear power. The UNS MCAS system, launched in 2022, monitors ecosystems' emissions and absorption capacities to optimize land management. Nuclear energy currently provides 20% of the nation's power, with a 25% projected by 2040. While the ambitious plans to develop hydrogen energy were declared in 2020-2021, Western sanctions have hindered progress as Russia had to pivot toward domestic technical development over global partnerships.

JUST TRANSITION



Russia's vision of just energy transition is based on the principle of technological neutrality, ensuring no emission-reduction method is unfairly disadvantaged. Long-Term Low-Emission Strategy to 2050 emphasizes that green development shouldn't undermine the country's economic competitiveness. National adaptation planning includes equity dimensions – indigenous people's rights and access to critical services. While Russian regions participate in governance by developing regional adaptation plans. While largely domestically driven, Russia actively promotes its just transition concept through international fora, particularly BRICS.

WHAT THEY SAID THEN: 2015

"We believe it is fundamentally important that the new climate agreement be based on the principles of the UNFCCC and be legally binding, with both developed and developing economies participating in its implementation. We believe it should be comprehensive, effective and equitable."

UNFCCC, 2015



Vladimir V. Putin (President of the Russian Federation from 1999 to 2008, and from 2012 to the present)

COP21
November 2015

WHAT THEY SAY NOW: 2025

"Each country's path to a low-carbon future is unique. For that reason, the Just Transition working programme must remain a platform for dialogue and experience exchange, not a tool for imposing new obligations. We need practical results, skills development, and technology transfer. (...) The path from Baku to Belém must become a path toward building trust and mobilising resources, not toward creating new barriers"

TASS, 2025

Ruslan Edelgeriyev (Special Presidential Representative for Climate and Water Resources)

Before COP 30
November 2025



GENERAL OVERVIEW BY



The overall assessment reveals steady institutional consolidation but uneven transformation. As a fossil fuel exporter, Russia perceives the global energy transition as a threat rather than an opportunity. Sanctions also restrict access to capital for mitigation. As a result, climate policy prioritizes adaptation, while relying on LULUCF for mitigation: Russia plans to reach carbon neutrality by 2060 primarily through increased forest absorption rather than emission reductions. In GHG regulation, key priorities include emissions monitoring, regional pilot initiatives, and voluntary markets. In terms of future progress, long-term diversification would support emissions reduction, while international cooperation could increase access to green finance and low-carbon technologies.


TÜRKIYE: FROM PARIS TO PROGRESS — STILL CLOSING THE GAP

A decade from Paris: Country Notes Collection from Climate Transparency partners



2015 | Share of fossil fuels (coal and natural gas) in electricity generation: **65%**

2025 | Share of fossil fuels (coal and natural gas) in electricity generation: **54%**




2015 | Share of electricity generation from solar: **0.2%** (0.19 TWh) and wind: **4.0%** (11.65 TWh).

2025 | Share of electricity generation from solar: **8.7%** (30.7 TWh) and wind: **10.4%** (36.8 TWh).

GENERAL PROGRESS: PARIS GOALS

FINANCE MOBILIZATION



Before ratifying the Paris Agreement (pre-2021), Türkiye's climate finance was limited, reliant on EU, EBRD and MDB loans for renewables. After ratification in October 2021, Türkiye mobilized major MoUs with World Bank, EBRD, IFC and others for billions in finance, launched green finance frameworks and industrial decarbonization platform.

LOW-CARBON TECH



Since the introduction of YEKDEM in 2011, Türkiye has rapidly expanded solar&wind capacity, becoming a leading producer, though still behind countries like Germany and Spain. Solar investments have accelerated faster than wind. Energy efficiency in industry is improving, while transport electrification, heat pumps, advanced recycling, and industrial decarbonization technologies remain limited and require stronger policy support and binding legislation.

JUST TRANSITION



Integrating a just transition into Türkiye's climate policy gained legal recognition with the 2025 Climate Law, which defines just transition and climate justice as core principles. However, the absence of a regional transition framework leaves coal-dependent regions vulnerable. Just transition debates overlook the coal phase-down implied by 2035 renewables targets, while voluntary initiatives remain fragmented and locally driven.

WHAT THEY SAID THEN: 2015

"The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" enshrined in the Convention must be preserved. The Paris Agreement should introduce a realistic and flexible system independent of the annexes of the Convention. To ensure balance within the Agreement, mitigation and adaptation should be addressed on an equal footing, and implementation should be strengthened through the support provided. The primary responsibility in this regard should be assumed by developed countries."

UNFCCC, 2015



Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
(President of Türkiye from 2014 until now)

COP21
November 2015

WHAT THEY SAY NOW: 2025

As of this year, we have increased the share of renewable energy in total installed capacity to over 60 percent. We are rapidly strengthening infrastructure—particularly for electric vehicle production—and prioritizing railway investments. In line with our 2053 net zero emissions target, we will continue transforming our key sectors. To achieve these objectives, international cooperation in financing, access, and technology is essential."

Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2025

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
(President of Türkiye from 2014 until now)

UN Climate Summit
September 2025



GENERAL OVERVIEW BY IPC

ISTANBUL POLICY CENTER
SABANCI UNIVERSITY
STIFTUNG MERCATOR INITIATIVE

Türkiye's NDCs rely on BAU projections, with the NDC 3.0 allowing a 22% emissions rise by 2035. The new Climate Law lacks binding 2030 targets, the national ETS sets no emission caps, and the LTS delays sectoral action until after the 2040s. Türkiye must revise its framework in line with EU standards, introducing binding GHG targets for transport, energy, buildings, industry, and LULUCF. A planned, binding policy architecture and stronger governance are essential to align environmental and industrial policies, supported by dedicated climate and social funds to ensure a just transition and electrification.

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


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